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Book Reviews and Notices 479
1863. The first official intelligence apparatiis in the U.S. Army, the BMI
provided key information—gleaned from Richmond spy rings, news-
papers, and scouts—which Grant used to defeat Lee.
A lack of information could make a command inert and vulner-
able, as in George McCleUan's case. Grant realized early on that all
generals, including the enemy, face this düemma, but instead of end-
lessly waiting for perfect intelligence, he boldly took the initiative.
He made mistakes. At Shiloh, according to Feis, it was Grant's belief
that the Confederates were unable and unwilling to attack that led to
the disastrous first day, not an intelligence failure. More important
was Grant and the BMI's faüure to discover and prevent Jubal Early's
Shenandoah Valley raid in the summer of 1864. Feis argues that such
miscues were often the result of general human faüings such as the
misperception and wishful thinking that afflict all judgments. More
than mere exculpation, Feis ülustrates the difficulties of generalship
while demonsti'ating how Grant the man both persevered and ex-
celled.
Feis's pioneering approach sheds light on Grant but precludes
much contextual analysis. In other words. Grant is somewhat in a
vacuum here. One hopes that Feis will undertake a scrutiny of the in-
teUigence used by other Civil War generals—especially Robert E. Lee
—for comparison. But with this portrait Feis challenges the view of
Grant as the butcher of Cold Harbor winning only with superior num-
bers. The lens of intelligence shows Grant as a complex flgure calculat-
ing with inteUect and instinct. Despite Sherman's statement to the con-
trary. Grant really did "Care a Damn for What the Enemy Does Out of
His Sight," to devastating effect (267).
Struggle for the Heartland: The Civil War along the Mississippi Corridor,
by Joseph W. Foulke. Pittsburgh: Dorrance PubUshing Co., Inc., 200l!
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Reviewer Terry L. Beckenbaugh is assistant professor of history at McNeese
State University in Lake Charles, Louisiana. His research and writing have fo-
cused on Civil War general Samuel Ryan Curtis.
In Struggle for the Heartland, Joseph W. Foulke tackles a broad subject:
the Civü War in the Mississippi River valley Foulke argues that even-
tual Union victory resulted from events in the West, specifically the Fed-
eral conquest of the Mississippi River valley He highlights Iowans'
valuable contributions to the war effort, especially in the West.
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Unfortunately, Struggle for the Heartland is riddled with errors. The
work suffers from sloppy proofreading. For example, on page one Fort
Sumter is misspelled "Fort Sumpter." Grammatical and typographical
errors are sprinkled liberally throughout the text. There are also factual
mistakes, begirming on page one when Foulke correctly states that
South Carolina seceded first but does not explain why (the election of
Republican Abraham Lincoln in November 1860) and then asserts, "In
due course other Southem states would succeed [sic], eleven in all."
This treats the secession of the eleven slave states as one event, when
in reality there were two distinct waves. The irütial seven states of the
Confederacy broke away between December 1860 and February 1861.
Only after Fort Siunter and Lincoln's call on the states for 75,000 vol-
unteers to put down the insurrection in April 1861 did four more
states secede from the Union. On page 38 Foulke repeats the story of
James "Wild Bill" Hickok's role in the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas,
on March 6-8,1862. Yet according to the best monograph on the battle,
William Shea and Earl Hess's Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the
West (1992), Hickok did not participate in the battle and did not even
belong to the Army of the Southwest. Foulke also does not properly
document his sources. It is difficult to ascertain his sources of informa-
tion due to inconsistent and spotty footnoting. Throughout the text
there are long passages that are not common knowledge that go un-
footnoted. Foulke also fails to use the latest scholarship. For example,
his discussion of Wilson's Creek does not cite William Garrett Piston
and Richard W Hatcher Hi's fine monograph on that battle, Wilson's
Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It
(2000). This is orüy a sampling of the major problems.
The strength of Struggle for the Heartland is Foulke's research on
Iowa regiments, but there are drawbacks there as well. Appendix B
lists all the Iowa regiments, when and where they enrolled, and the
major campaigns each fought in, yet does not list when and where
they mustered out. Perhaps Foulke should have focused on the Iowa
contribution to the war effort. There are better general studies on the
struggle for the Mississippi River valley, such as Stephen D. Engle's
Struggle for the Heartland: Campaigns from Fort Henry to Corinth (2001).
Although more limited in scope, Engle's work, published one month
after Foulke's, holds to a higher standard of scholarship and is still
appropriate for a general audience.
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